Kant's Critique of Judgement

§ 9. Investigation of the question whether in a judgement of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes or follows the judging of the object 63

Third Moment of judgements of taste according to the relation of the purposes which are brought into consideration therein 67

§ 10. Of purposiveness in general 67

§ 11. The judgement of taste has nothing at its basis but the form of the purposiveness of an object (or of its mode of representation) 69

§ 12. The judgement of taste rests on a priori grounds 70

§ 13. The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and emotion 72

§ 14. Elucidation by means of examples 73

§ 15. The judgement of taste is quite independent of the concept of perfection 77

§ 16. The judgement of taste, by which an object is declared to be beautiful under the condition of a definite concept, is not pure 81

§ 17. Of the Ideal of Beauty 84

Fourth Moment of the judgement of taste, according to the modality of the satisfaction in the object 91

§ 18. What the modality in a judgement of taste is 91

§ 19. The subjective necessity which we ascribe to the judgement of taste is conditioned 92

§ 20. The condition of necessity which a judgement of taste asserts is the Idea of a common sense 92

§ 21. Have we ground for presupposing a common sense? 93

§ 22. The necessity of the universal agreement that is thought in a judgement of taste is a subjective necessity, which is represented as objective under the presupposition of a common sense 94

General remark on the first section of the Analytic 96

Second Book.--Analytic of the Sublime 101

§ 23. Transition from the faculty which judges of the Beautiful to that which judges of the Sublime 101

§ 24. Of the divisions of an investigation into the feeling of the Sublime 105

A.--Of the Mathematically Sublime 106

§ 25. Explanation of the term “Sublime” 106

§ 26. Of that estimation of the magnitude of natural things which is requisite for the Idea of the Sublime 110

§ 27. Of the quality of the satisfaction in our judgements upon the Sublime 119

B.--Of the Dynamically Sublime in Nature 123

§ 28. Of Nature regarded as Might 123

§ 29. Of the modality of the judgement upon the sublime in nature 130

General remark upon the exposition of the aesthetical reflective Judgement 132

Deduction of [pure] aesthetical judgements 150

§ 30. The Deduction of aesthetical judgements on the objects of nature must not be directed to what we call Sublime in nature, but only to the Beautiful 150

§ 31. Of the method of deduction of judgements of taste 152

§ 32. First peculiarity of the judgement of taste 154

§ 33. Second peculiarity of the judgement of taste 157

§ 34. There is no objective principle of taste possible 159

§ 35. The principle of Taste is the subjective principle of Judgement in general 161

§ 36. Of the problem of a Deduction of judgements of Taste 162

§ 37. What is properly asserted a priori of an object in a judgement of taste 164

§ 38. Deduction of judgements of taste 165

§ 39. Of the communicability of a sensation 167

§ 40. Of taste as a kind of sensus communis 169

§ 41. Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful 173

§ 42. Of the intellectual interest in the Beautiful 176

§ 43. Of Art in general 183

§ 44. Of beautiful Art 185

§ 45. Beautiful art is an art in so far as it seems like nature 187

§ 46. Beautiful art is the art of genius 188

§ 47. Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of Genius 190

§ 48. Of the relation of Genius to Taste 193