The Theory of Moral Sentiments

Of the effects of prosperity and adversity upon the judgment of mankind with regard to the propriety of action; and why it is more easy to obtain their approbation in the one state than in the other 64

CHAP. I. _That though our sympathy with sorrow is generally a more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy, it commonly falls much more short of the violence of what is naturally felt by the person principally concerned_ ibid.

CHAP. II. Of the origin of ambition, and of the distinction of ranks 74

CHAP. III. Of the stoical philosophy 89

PART II.

Of Merit and Demerit; or of the objects of reward and punishment.

SECTION I.

Of the sense of merit and demerit 97

CHAP. I. _That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment, appears to deserve punishment_ 98

CHAP. II. Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment 102

CHAP. III. _That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it_ 106

CHAP. IV. Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters 109

CHAP. V. The analysis of the sense of merit and demerit 112

SECTION II.

Of justice and beneficence 119

CHAP. I. Comparison of those two virtues ibid.

CHAP. II. Of the sense of justice, of remorse, and of the consciousness of merit 126

CHAP. III. Of the utility of this constitution of nature 132

SECTION III.

Of the influence of fortune upon the sentiments of mankind, with regard to the merit or demerit of actions 145

CHAP. I. Of the causes of this influence of fortune 148

CHAP. II. Of the extent of this influence of fortune 154

CHAP. III. Of the final cause of this irregularity of sentiments 167

PART III.

Of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty.

CHAP. I. Of the consciousness of merited praise or blame 173

CHAP. II. In what manner our own judgments refer to what ought to be the judgments of others: and of the origin of general rules 180

CHAP. III. Of the influence and authority of the general rules of morality, and that they are justly regarded as the laws of the Deity 207

CHAP. IV. In what cases the sense of duty ought to be the sole principle of our conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur with other motives 223

PART IV.

Of the effect of utility upon the sentiments of approbation.

CHAP. I. Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon all the productions of art, and of the extensive influence of this species of beauty 237

CHAP. II. Of the beauty which the appearance of utility bestows upon the characters and actions of men; and how far the perception of this beauty may be regarded as one of the original principles of approbation 250

PART V.

Of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation.

CHAP. I. Of the influence of custom and fashion upon our notions of beauty and deformity 261

CHAP. II. Of the influence of custom and fashion upon moral sentiments 271

PART VI.

Of Systems of Moral Philosophy.

SECTION I.

Of the questions which ought to be examined in a theory of moral sentiments 291

SECTION II.

Of the different accounts which have been given of the nature of virtue 294

CHAP. I. Of those systems which make virtue consist in propriety 295