From Isolation to Leadership, Revised

The first edition of this book appeared in October, 1918, a few weeks before the signing of the Armistice, when the United States was at the high tide of its power and influence. In view of the subsequent course of events, some of my readers may question the propriety of the original title. In fact, one of my friends has suggested that a more appropriate title for the new edition would be "From Isolation to Leadership, and Back." But I do not regard the verdict of 1920 as an expression of the final judgment of the American people. The world still waits on America, and sooner or later we must recognize and assume the responsibilities of our position as a great world power.

The first nine chapters are reprinted with only a few verbal changes. Chapter X has been rewritten, and chapters XI and XII have been added.

JOHN H. LATANE.

Baltimore, June 10, 1922.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

I. ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION II. FORMULATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE III. THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITHOUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE V. THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY VI. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS VII. IMPERIALISTIC TENDENCIES OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE VIII. THE NEW PAN-AMERICANISM IX. THE FAILURE OF NEUTRALITY AND ISOLATION X. THE WAR AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES XI. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES XII. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE INDEX

From Isolation to Leadership

I

ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION

The Monroe Doctrine and the policy of political isolation are two phases of American diplomacy so closely related that very few writers appear to draw any distinction between them. The Monroe Doctrine was in its origin nothing more than the assertion, with special application to the American continents, of the right of independent states to pursue their own careers without fear or threat of intervention, domination, or subjugation by other states. President Monroe announced to the world that this principle would be upheld by the United States in this hemisphere. The policy of isolation was the outgrowth of Washington's warning against permanent alliances and Jefferson's warning against entangling alliances. Both Washington and Jefferson had in mind apparently the form of European alliance common in their day, which bound one nation to support another both diplomatically and by force in any dispute that might arise no matter whether it concerned the interests of the first state or not. Such alliances were usually of the nature of family compacts between different dynasties, or between different branches of the same dynasty, rather than treaties between nations. In fact, dynastic aims and ambitions were frequently, if not usually, at variance with the real interests of the peoples affected. It will be shown later that neither Washington nor Jefferson intended that the United States should refrain permanently from the exercise of its due influence in matters which properly concern the peace and welfare of the community of nations. Washington did not object to temporary alliances for special emergencies nor did Jefferson object to special alliances for the accomplishment of definite objects. Their advice has, however, been generally interpreted as meaning that the United States must hold aloof from world politics and attend strictly to its own business.