The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas

THE frequent references made in the present work, on my own authority, to customs and ideas prevalent among the natives of Morocco, require a word of explanation. Seeing the close connection between moral opinions and magic and religious beliefs, I thought it might be useful for me to acquire first-hand knowledge of the folk-lore of some non-European people, and for various reasons I chose Morocco as my field of research. During the four years I spent there, largely among its country population, I have not only collected anthropological data, but tried to make myself familiar with the native way of thinking; and I venture to believe that this has helped me to understand various customs occurring at a stage of civilisation different from our own. I purpose before long to publish the detailed results of my studies in a special monograph on the popular religion and magics of the Moors.

For these researches I have derived much material support from the University of Helsingfors. I am also indebted to the Russian Minister at Tangier, M. B. de Bacheracht, for his kindness in helping me on several occasions when I was dependent on the Sultan's Government. All the time I have had the valuable assistance of my Moorish friend Shereef [(]Abd-es-Salâm el-Ba[k.][k.]âli, to whom credit {vi} is due for the kind reception I invariably received from peasants and mountaineers, not generally noted for friendliness towards Europeans.

I beg to express my best thanks to Mr. Stephen Gwynn for revising the first thirteen chapters, and to Mr. H. C. Minchin for revising the remaining portion of the book. To their suggestions I am indebted for the improvement of many phrases and expressions. I have likewise to thank my friend Mr. Alex. F. Shand for kindly reading the proofs of the earlier chapters and giving me the benefit of his opinion.

Throughout the work the reader will easily find how much I owe to British science and thought--a debt which is greater than I can ever express.

E. W.

London,

January, 1906.

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

THE present edition is only a reprint of the first, with a few inaccurate expressions corrected.

E. W.

London,

July, 1912.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY

The origin of the present investigation, p. 1.--Its subject-matter, p. 1 sq.--Its practical usefulness, p. 2 sq.

CHAPTER I

THE EMOTIONAL ORIGIN OF MORAL JUDGMENTS

The moral concepts essentially generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth moral emotions, pp. 4-6.--The assumed universality or "objectivity" of moral judgments, p. 6 sq.--Theories according to which the moral predicates derive all their import from reason, "theoretical" or "practical," p. 7 sq.--Our tendency to objectivise moral judgments, no sufficient ground for referring them to the province of reason, p. 8 sq.--This tendency partly due to the comparatively uniform nature of the moral consciousness, p. 9.--Differences of moral estimates resulting from circumstances of a purely intellectual character, pp. 9-11.--Differences of an emotional origin, pp. 11-13.--Quantitative, as well as qualitative, differences, p. 13.--The tendency to objectivise moral judgments partly due to the authority ascribed to moral rules, p. 14.--The origin and nature of this authority, pp. 14-17.--General moral truths non-existent, p. 17 sq.--The object of scientific ethics not to fix rules for human conduct, but to study the moral consciousness as a fact, p. 18.--The supposed dangers of ethical subjectivism, pp. 18-20.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS