Kant's Theory of Knowledge

Note: Images of the original pages are available through Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries. See http://www.archive.org/details/kantknowledge00pricuoft

Transcriber's note:

1. Text in italics is enclosed by underscores (italics).

2. The original text includes Greek characters. For this text version these letters have been replaced with transliterations represented within square brackets [Greek: ]. Also greek letters alpha and beta are represented as [alpha] and [beta] in this text.

3. A subscript is indicated by an underscore followed by the subscript in curly braces. For example, a_{2} indicates a with subscript 2.

4. Footnotes have been moved to the end of the paragraph wherein they have been referred to.

5. Other than the corrections listed above, printer's inconsistencies in spelling, punctuation and hyphenation have been retained.

KANT'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

by

H. A. PRICHARD

Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford

Oxford At the Clarendon Press 1909

Henry Frowde, M.A. Publisher to the University of Oxford London, Edinburgh, New York Toronto and Melbourne

PREFACE

This book is an attempt to think out the nature and tenability of Kant's Transcendental Idealism, an attempt animated by the conviction that even the elucidation of Kant's meaning, apart from any criticism, is impossible without a discussion on their own merits of the main issues which he raises.

My obligations are many and great: to Caird's Critical Philosophy of Kant and to the translations of Meiklejohn, Max Müller, and Professor Mahaffy; to Mr. J. A. Smith, Fellow of Balliol College, and to Mr. H. W. B. Joseph, Fellow of New College, for what I have learned from them in discussion; to Mr. A. J. Jenkinson, Fellow of Brasenose College, for reading and commenting on the first half of the MS.; to Mr. H. H. Joachim, Fellow of Merton College, for making many important suggestions, especially with regard to matters of translation; to Mr. Joseph, for reading the whole of the proofs and for making many valuable corrections; and, above all, to my wife for constant and unfailing help throughout, and to Professor Cook Wilson, to have been whose pupil I count the greatest of philosophical good fortunes. Some years ago it was my privilege to be a member of a class with which Professor Cook Wilson read a portion of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and subsequently I have had the advantage of discussing with him several of the more important passages. I am especially indebted to him in my discussion of the following topics: the distinction between the Sensibility and the Understanding (pp. 27-31, 146-9, 162-6), the term 'form of perception' (pp. 37, 40, 133 fin.-135), the Metaphysical Exposition of Space (pp. 41-8), Inner Sense (Ch. V, and pp. 138-9), the Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories (pp. 149-53), Kant's account of 'the reference of representations to an object' (pp. 178-86), an implication of perspective (p. 90), the impossibility of a 'theory' of knowledge (p. 245), and the points considered, pp. 200 med.-202 med., 214 med.-215 med., and 218. The views expressed in the pages referred to originated from Professor Cook Wilson, though it must not be assumed that he would accept them in the form in which they are there stated.